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In the early 2000s, the Parliament of the Canary Islands passed a series of tourism moratoria to 
restrict the growth in tourism supply. Even though the effects of moratoria have been covered 
in the literature, there is little quantitative evidence about their economic impact on the 
destinations, particularly in relation to the goal of increasing the quality of the accommodation 
supply. In order to fill this gap, this paper employs both regression and computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) methods to estimate the economic impact of the increased 5-star capacity 
acquired by the Canary Islands during the three moratoria periods between 2003 and 2017. The 
regression results show that the successive moratoria had a significant impact on the 5-star 
hotel supply in the Islands, while the CGE model translates the extra capacity into a positive 
impact on social welfare, with output increases in the sectors that complement tourism activity.    
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After a long process that started in the late 1990s, the Parliament of the Canary Islands finally 
approved their Tourism Development Directives in 2003, which were accompanied by the 
imposition of temporary restrictions on the development on new tourism accommodation 
(commonly known as a tourism moratorium). These regulations appeared in a context of 
uncontrolled growth in tourism supply, fuelled by a construction bubble, that coincided with a 
period in which the major inbound markets in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Nordic 
countries entered a phase of stagnation (Villar-Rojas, 2009). Tourism moratoria typically 
include exceptions that allow authorities to grant construction licenses to high-quality hotels 
as well as to incentivise hotel companies to invest in innovation and rejuvenation of the 
available infrastructure (Hernández-Martín, Álvarez-Albelo & Padrón-Fumero, 2015). These 
exceptions have been progressively expanded in successive amendments to the initial Canarian 
moratoria. As a result, the Canarian law is not a unified legal body, but it is comprised of 
several laws. Simancas-Cruz (2015) justifies said exceptions in the Canarian case, noting that 
these laws have failed in limiting the use of land, one of the main aims pursued by the 
moratoria, but, on the other hand, they have effectively restricted the growth of tourism supply 
in the Islands and also led to upgrades in the quality of accomodation. While these policies 
may allow the destination to appeal to high-end visitors and increase tourism receipts, authors 
have also commented on the threats posed by regulatory capture and reduced competition 
linked to increased entry barriers (Bianchi, 2004).   
The need for higher quality and rejuvenation in tourism-based regions can be also supported 
and understood from a more general economic perspective. The lower productivity gains 
attained in services-based activities compared with industrial activities (Fixler & Siegel, 1999; 
Acelus & Arozena, 1999; or Nordhaus, 2001) represents a matter of concern for any tourism-
led economy. Developed economies tend to focus on more productive activities, those that 
generate higher value added and can sustain higher salaries when the economy grows 
(Hausmann, Hwang & Rodrick, 2007; Cherif & Hasanov, 2014; Jarreau & Poncet, 2012; or 
Papageorgiou & Spatafora,  2012). Moreover, these economies also experience a higher export 
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income elasticity (above one) than those of developing economies (Bahmani-Oskooee & Kara, 
2005). On the contrary, such sectoral transitions are severely capped in tourism-led economies 
where services represent the largest share of the GDP and the industrial sector accounts only 
for a marginal weight. As a consequence, quality improvements become a key economic policy 
to ensure the sustainability and long-term growth of current and future tourist destinations 
(Capó, Riera & Rosselló, 2007; and Inchausti-Sintes, 2019). The historically high income 
elasticity of tourism (Algieri & Kanellopoulou, 2009; Falk, 2014; Witt & Martin, 1987; Song, 
Romilly & Liu, 2000; Untong, Ramos, Kaosa-Ard & Rey-Maquieira, 2015) provides a suitable 
context for quality improvement and value-added gains in tourism-led regions.  
Past studies on the Canary Islands’ tourism moratoria have been largely descriptive (e.g. 
Bianchi, 2004; Hernández-Martín et al., 2015) and offer many consistent views on the positive 
and negative aspects of restricting tourism supply. However, there is little quantitative evidence 
in the literature about the overall economic impact on the destinations, particularly in relation 
to one of its main goals: to rejuvenate and increase the quality of the accommodation supply. 
Authors like Dwyer, Forsyth and Spurr (2004) recommend a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model to evaluate how the restrictions and incentives on the development of tourism 
accommodation can affect the allocation of resources, the level of employment, or, as noted by 
Hernández-Martín et al. (2015), the development of complementary tourism services.  
In order to fill this gap, this paper employs both panel-data linear regression and computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) methods to estimate the economic impact of the increased 5-star 
capacity acquired by the Canary Islands during the successive moratoria period between 2003 
and 2017. A dataset of annual tourism capacity per hotel category was collected from official 
sources, including the two Canarian provinces of Las Palmas and Santa Cruz de Tenerife, 
which are benchmarked against other Mediterranean coastal provinces in Spain. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review on 
the economic effects of tourism moratoria and the applications of CGE in the area of tourism. 
Section 3 presents the Canary Islands’ case study, covers the process of data collection and 
processing, as well as the regression and CGE approaches. Section 4 presents the results and 
discusses their main implications. Section 5 concludes with a summary of the main findings. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Tourism moratoria 
The use of public resources (such as natural parks, lakes or beaches) in the provision of tourist 
services can be linked to over-exploitation and congestion (Hillery, Nancarrow, Griffin & 
Syme, 2001), which threaten the destinations’ natural environment and, in a sort of vicious 
cycle, can also reduce the value that visitors place on the natural resources (Lukashina, 
Amirkhanov, Anisimov & Trunev, 1996). Thus, environmental degradation can also threaten 
the long-term sustainability of economic activity in places that are highly dependent on tourism 
(Hernández-Martín et al., 2015). These problems are most relevant when the destination 
specializes in mass tourism, which typically depends on large infrastructure to be located 
relatively close to the target natural resource, as visitors value comfort and accessibility above 
other aspects (Hernández & León, 2007). In order to ensure the long-term sustainability of 
tourism, the rate of regeneration of the natural resource needs to be higher than the social 
discount rate (Hernández & León, 2013). There are several policy instruments that can be used 
to work towards that goal. Since congestion can be linked to the number of incoming visitors, 
the introduction of tourism taxes has been a popular policy among local authorities, as it can 
lead to a rationalization of demand (due to the internalization of the negative congestion 
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externalities) and the generation of additional revenue to invest in the preservation of local 
tourism resources (Palmer & Riera, 2003). On the one hand, tourist taxes can be an efficient 
source of revenue, since they shift the tax burden away from locals and the tourists are made 
to bear the associated welfare loss (Gooroochurn and Sinclair, 2005). On the other hand, if 
visitors have a high price sensitivity, tourist taxes can have a negative impact on demand and 
revenues (Durbarry, 2008). 
An alternative policy instrument is the introduction of restrictions on the growth of the 
accommodation supply (Pintassilgo & Silva, 2007), which are typically temporary and become 
part of a broader piece of regulation referred to as tourism moratoria. These restrictions can 
serve to rationalize supply in a context of conflicting trends in three key areas: 1) inbound 
visitor markets reaching maturity (Baez-García, Flores-Muñoz & Gutiérrez-Barroso, 2018), 2) 
strong growth in new tourism capacity supported by a very energic construction sector 
(possibly in the midst of a construction bubble), and 3) increasing political concern about the 
environmental impact of tourism activity (Millares-i-García, 2016). The cases of Cyprus and 
the Canary Islands are commonly cited examples of tourism moratoria that match these 
background conditions (Hernández-Martín et al., 2015). Besides controlling supply, authorities 
also aim to improve the quality of the available infrastructure to become a more competitive 
destination and attract a new segment of high-expenditure visitors, thus also increasing the 
productivity of the tourism sector (Sharpley, 2003). Thus, moratoria typically include 
exceptions and other incentives for construction licenses of new high-end accommodation 
facilities (Chapman & Speake, 2011) or the renewal of existing facilities to increase their rating 
(e.g. hotel stars).  
The need for regulatory intervention arises from the fact that the natural dynamics of innovation 
in accommodation markets may drive a wedge between the objectives of the private companies 
in the hospitality sector and those of the overall destination. These dynamics can be linked to 
1) the principles of Schumpeterian economics, which state that the possession of market power 
has a positive impact on the ability to innovate (due to extraordinary profits), yet the incentives 
to actually invest in innovation are stronger in competitive markets (since the potential rewards 
of differentiating from the competitors are higher) (Church & Ware, 2000), and 2) the existence 
of horizontal service externalities in the accommodation sector, which means that non-
innovating companies can free-ride on the investments made by others that increase the value 
visitors place on the overall destination (Hjalager, 2002). Thus, a mature destination with an 
outdated accommodation supply will not naturally attract any investment in innovation as the 
incumbents will not have the necessary profits to fund it (low-quality facilities attract low-end 
customers and lack of differentiation leads to strong competition) and any incentives to invest 
in quality will be diluted by the free-riding problem described above. In this context, 
Hernández-Martín et al. (2015) note how a tourism moratorium can stop these vicious 
dynamics by limiting competition, as long as provisions are also made to promote innovation. 
The authors also note that incumbents may engage in counterproductive practices in the period 
leading to the moratorium entering into force, with a strong surge in applications for 
construction licenses that worsens the excess capacity problem and limits the resources 
available for renovation projects. Villar-Rojas (2009) also notes that firms may switch to long-
term residential markets to bypass the regulatory restrictions. This residential use implies a less 
efficient use of public resources (e.g. coastal areas), since it does not have the same impact on 
local employment, generates less tax revenues (Rodríguez, 2004), and can even serve as front 
for illegal tourism accommodation (Hernández-Martín et al., 2015), particularly in the current 
context of strong development of “sharing economy” platforms, such as Airbnb. 
In spite of the well-documented positive and negative aspects of tourism moratoria, there is 
little quantitative evidence in the literature about their overall economic impact on tourism 
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destinations. In the case of the Canary Islands, the available studies are largely descriptive (e.g. 
Bianchi, 2004; Villar-Rojas, 2009; Rodríguez, 2014; Hernández-Martín et al., 2015; and 
Parreño-Castellano, González-Morales & Hernández-Luis, 2018), yet some authors (Bianchi, 
2004) deliver strong conclusions about the threats posed by regulatory capture and the lobbying 
efforts by dominant players in the hospitality sector that seek to reap the benefits from increased 
concentration linked to entry barriers. Despite the potential benefits of targeting new inbound 
markets, the overall goal of investing in innovation to improve the quality of the 
accommodation supply must be consistent, at least in the short term, with the destination’s 
established market focus, which is typically mass tourism (Farsari, Butler & Prastacos, 2007). 
In the case of Cyprus, Sharpley (2003) notes how the moratoria failed to transform the 
destination into a higher-quality and more sustainable tourism product, given the mismatch 
between that goal and the persistent focus towards mass tourism that kept driving the sector. 
In this context, there is a gap in the literature for quantitative studies about the economic impact 
of tourism moratoria in the regions that have implemented them. As noted by Dwyer et al. 
(2004), a general equilibrium approach would be the right methodology to evaluate how the 
restrictions and incentives on the development of tourism accommodation can affect the overall 
allocation of resources in the local economies. Hernández-Martín et al. (2015) expanded on 
that idea to note the three main areas of impact: 1) rationalization of the tourism sector (which 
can free economic resources for other sectors), 2) impact on employment and income 
distribution (with a reduction of supply that can also lower wages), and 3) development of 
complementary tourism services, as a result of the higher-quality market focus that attracts 
price-inelastic visitors willing to spend more in food, shopping or leisure activities. The effects 
can be captured by a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. 
CGE contributions in this area most often conclude that tourism improves social welfare 
(Copeland, 1991; Blake et al., 2006; Blake, 2000; Hazari & Sgro, 2004) and relieves poverty 
and/or inequality (Blake, Arbache, Sinclair, & Teles, 2008; Wattanakuljarus & Coxhead, 2008; 
Pratt, 2014; Njoya & Seetaram, 2018; Gatti, 2013). Nevertheless, tourism also comes with 
some sectoral consequences to be addressed.  The two most important are: the appreciation of 
the real exchange rate and the rise in demand for non-tradable goods (Copeland, 1991; Chao, 
Hazari, Laffargue, Sgro & Yu, 2006). The former erodes traditional exports, while imports 
become cheaper. The latter implies a shift of resources from tradable to non-tradable sectors, 
eroding their competitiveness and productivity. This can hamper growth when sectors 
experience economies of scale (Copeland, 1991). Moreover, both effects may also be a 
symptom of a more severe economic consequence known as the “Dutch Disease” (Corden & 
Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984), which is known to affect tourism sectors (Nowak & Sahli, 2007; 
Chao et al., 2006; and Inchausti-Sintes, 2015).  
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Case study and datasets 
The moratorium on tourism accommodation in the Canary Islands can be traced back to the 
late 1990s, when the accelerated growth in the construction of new hotels and tourism beds 
contrasted with the maturity of the Islands’ inbound markets, such as the United Kingdom, 
Germany, or the Nordic Countries (Hernández-Martín et al., 2015). This prompted the regional 
government to approve legislation to restrict the construction of any new accommodation 
supply with the objectives to preserve the islands’ natural resources and use it as an instrument 
of strategic planning at a regional level, with the underlying goal of improving the quality of 
accommodation establishments (Álvarez-Moleiro, 2015).  
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To date, three different moratoria regulations have been established in the Canary Islands, 
though the chronology of events allows us to define five stages in their implementation 
(Garzón, 2013): 
0) Suspended moratorium (January 2001 to April 2003): the original decrees from the 
regional Government aimed to paralyze all construction licenses with few exceptions, such 
as a) those for new hotels that represented a “substantial qualitative increase in the tourism 
supply”, b) for rehabilitation projects to increase the category of any establishment without 
increasing its supply of beds, and c) for construction or rehabilitation projects in 
“consolidated urban land” with the objective to expand the supply of urban tourism 
establishments. These decrees were all suspended by the High Court, until a law was 
finally passed in April 2003. 
1a) First moratorium (April 2003-April 2006): the law 19/2003, which contained the new 
Tourism Directive of the Canary Islands, contained essentially the same provisions of the 
previously suspended decrees. Higher-quality hotels of “exceptional” nature were still 
exempted from the moratorium, provided they were deemed as beneficial to public interest 
by the Regional Parliament. 
1b) Extension of the first moratorium (April 2006-May 2009): In spite of the need to approve 
a new law within three years from the publication of the previous one, the lack of political 
consensus led to an extension of the provisions of the first moratorium that ended up lasting 
for another three years. 
2) Second Moratorium with extension (May 2009-May 2013): The new law (6/2009) relaxed 
the restrictions on hotels with a category of 5-star “grand luxury” that also doubled as 
“hotel-school” (hotel escuela) for the training of personnel. It also provided incentives 
(within the first two years of the new law) for hotels to either be demolished and moved to 
superior locations, or, in the case of refurbishment and upgrades, the hotels were allowed 
small increases in their bed supply. 
3) Third moratorium (May 2013-present): the current law (2/2013), amongst other things, 
further relaxed the concession of construction licenses for “regular” 5-star hotels. 
These regulations apply to the entire Autonomous Community of the Canary Islands, which is 
split into two provinces: the Province of Las Palmas comprises the eastern islands of Gran 
Canaria, Fuerteventura, and Lanzarote; while the Province of Santa Cruz de Tenerife comprises 
the western islands of Tenerife, La Palma, La Gomera, and El Hierro. Despite the common 
rules, it is worth noting that construction licenses had to be first authorized by the islands’ own 
governments (Cabildos). Furthermore, other political, socio-economic, and geographical 
differences across islands beg the question on whether the moratorium had an uniform impact 
across the region.  
As a proxy for the overall supply of high-quality accommodation, the evolution in the number 
of 5-star hotel beds in the two provinces of the Canary Islands, in comparison with the other 
Spanish provinces, is shown in Figure 1. Before the first moratorium, the annual 5-star 
accommodation offering (calculated by aggregating the monthly supply reported by the 
Spanish National Statistics Institute - INE) was steady around 40,000 beds in both Canarian 
provinces and similar, in size, to the supply in the Mediterranean provinces of Málaga and 
Barcelona. After the first law was approved, the supply of 5-star beds steadily increased in 
Tenerife, while Las Palmas suddenly caught up with the western province in 2006 at a level of 
supply that doubled the one existing five years ago (by far the largest in Spain, which is 
consistent with the Canaries being a “year-round destination”, as opposed to the extreme annual 
seasonality of other regions like the Balearic Islands). This sharp increase in 5-star hotel 
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capacity observed in Las Palmas can be related to the “boom” of applications for construction 
licenses before the first moratorium entered into force, which created a large stock of hotel 
capacity “in progress” that abruptly entered the market in 2006 (González & Turégano, 2012). 
Furthermore, this first period of development coincided with the boom of the construction 
sector in Spain that also led to a substantial increase in income and population in the Canaries 
(Garzón, 2013). Over the successive periods, the development trend was the same, with 
Tenerife leading the growth and Las Palmas eventually catching up. This explosive and steady 
growth has only been matched by the Balearic Islands, which had their own regulations in place 
since the 80s with similar provisions about the development of high-quality establishments and 
the barriers to low-quality ones (Rullán-Salamanca, 2010). Finally, it is worth mentioning the 
decrease in the hotel supply in the province of Málaga, which is due to an increasing proportion 
of hoteliers deciding to close their establishments during off-peak season, thus effectively 
reducing the annual hotel supply (Montero, 2011). 
[Figure 1] 
3.2 Panel data regression 
The first methodological stage is a regression analysis. A balanced panel dataset of 266 
observations was obtained. This includes a cross-section of 14 Spanish provinces over 19 years 
(1999-2017). Even though the information was readily available for all 50 provinces and the 2 
autonomous cities in Spain, only Mediterranean coastal provinces were included in the sample 
alongside the Canaries to keep some degree of comparability in regard to the sun-and-beach 
tourism profile (i.e. Alicante, Almería, Barcelona, Cádiz, Castellón, Girona, Granada, Huelva1, 
Malaga, Murcia, Las Palmas, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Tarragona and Valencia).  
Our basic specification is shown in Equation 1: 
(1) 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏5𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠1_𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠2_𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠3_𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +
𝛽𝛽4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠1_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠2_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠3_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 +
∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
(2) 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where i=(1,…,14) denotes a province and t=(1,…,19) refers to a year. The usual random error 
is denoted by ε, and β refers to the vector of coefficients to be estimated. Finally, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 denotes 
the error disturbance which, in panel data, is disentangled into an unobservable individual 
specific effect (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) and the rest of the disturbance (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). The results of a Hausman test support 
the use of random effects (4.52, p-value<0.21), which is the approach we employ here. 
The dependent variable is the annual 5-star beds measured for province i in year t (beds5starsit). 
As right-hand side variables, we include six interaction dummy variables (i.e. treatments) to 
measure the impact of the different tourism moratoria in the two Canarian provinces (first 
moratorium with extension: 2003-2008, second: 2009-2012, and third: 2013-2017). The 
abbreviations LPA and SCTFE refer to the provinces of Las Palmas and Santa Cruz de Tenerife, 
respectively. Thus, mor1_LPA denotes the treatment effect of the first moratorium in Las 
Palmas. The meaning of the remaining labels for the treatment effects can be deduced by 
analogy. The inclusion of these dummy variables allows us to conduct a difference-in-
differences (DID) analysis (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). Figure 2 
shows the kind of effect captured by this approach. The moratoria (treatment) implies an 
upward shift in the supply of 5-star beds in both Canarian provinces (treatment units), with 
respect to an estimated counterfactual obtained from the data that includes the control 
                                                 
1 Huelva is located west of the Strait of Gibraltar, thus facing the Atlantic Ocean, and does not strictly have a 
Mediterranean coastline. However, it is considered comparable to the other coastal provinces in Andalusia. 
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provinces. A key requirement of the DID method is the parallel trend assumption, by which we 
do not omit any variable that changed in the Canaries but not in the rest of Spain at the same 
time as the treatment. This justifies removing the Balearics from the control sample because 
this province has had a tourism moratorium in place since 1999, which explains the different 
trend (Figure 1). Further support for the parallel-trend assumption can be seen in Figure 1 for 
the pre-treatment period, when the 5-star tourism supply in the Canaries had the same level and 
trend than other Mediterranean provinces. 
[Figure 2] 
We also include the local consumer price index (CPI) as a proxy variable for hotel prices. This 
can be linked to the theoretical framework of hotel room supply developed by Borooah (1999), 
in which supply decisions for guest rooms are made with respect to producer prices that 
represent the earnings per available room. While producer prices are not observable to us, we 
employ consumer prices instead as their variability can be expected to match that of average 
labor costs in the different provinces, which, in turn, can ultimately be linked to changes in 
average room rates, as noted by Qu, Xu, & Tan (2002). Even though all the sample provinces 
are coastal, the length of coastline in km (kmcoast) can also be a key differentiating factor of 
tourism supply across them. This is because hotels located in coastal areas have been shown to 
offer higher prices and enjoy increased profitability (Sami and Mohammed, 2014). The 
specification is completed with dummy variables for year and province that aim to capture the 
overall trend of tourism development in Spain, as well as additional non-observable 
heterogeneity across the sample provinces, in accordance with the view that tourism markets 
present differences at a sub-national level (Clewer, Pack & Sinclair, 1990). The descriptive 
statistics for the continuous variables are shown in Table 1. All variables are sourced from INE, 
the Spanish National Statistics Institute. 
[Table 1] 
After the regression coefficients have been obtained, the predicted increase in the number of 
5-star hotel beds in each moratoria period will be converted to a shock in the 5-star tourism 
demand using data on average occupancy rates. These estimates are then brought forward to a 
dynamic CGE model in order to determine their impacts in the regional economy. 
 
3.3 Dynamic Computable general equilibrium model 
The dynamic CGE model is calibrated according to the Canarian Input-Output Tables (IOTs) 
elaborated by the Canarian Statistical Institute (ISTAC). The most recently available tables 
correspond to 2005. However, we do not consider this a fatal flaw after investigating the 
evolution of sectoral shares in the Canaries between 2005 and 2017. Despite some fluctuations 
over the period, the overall economic structure of the Canaries has not changed significantly, 
especially in the sectors that relate to tourism activity, such as trade, accommodation, catering, 
or entertainment. The model has been programmed in the software GAMS using the 
mathematical programming system for general equilibrium (MPSGE) (Rutherford, 1999). The 
Canarian model assumes a small open economy with perfect factor mobility, competitive 
markets, flexible prices, nineteen sectors and goods, one government, one representative 
household and the elasticities have been taken from Hertel (1998)2. The main equation of the 
Canarian CGE model can be summarized as follows:   
                                                 
2 The elasticities are shown in Annex I 
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(3) 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾 �𝜒𝜒𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖




   
The model assumes imperfect substitution between domestic and import goods (Armington, 
1969). Subscripts i   and t  refer to commodities and time, respectively. Both imports ( ,i tM ) 
and domestic goods ( ,i tD ) are combined in i  composite goods in time t  (referred to as 
Armington goods - Ai,t) to be either consumed by the representative household, the government, 
or devoted to investment which, at the same time, is demanded by the representative household 
and the government. Such aggregation is carried out according to a constant elasticity of 
substtution (CES) function (Equation 3), where γ , iχ  and dmσ denote the scale parameter, the 
value share of domestic goods and the elasticity of substitution of domestic and imported 
products, respectively. When the Armington goods are demanded as intermediate goods, they 
are transformed according to a nested production function (Equations 4 and 5). In the first nest, 
capital ( ,a tK ) and labour ( ,a tL ) are demanded by each activity ( ta ) according to a CES function 
to form a composite good ( ava ). η , φ  and ρ  denote the scale parameter, the value share of 
capital and the elasticity of substitution by activities, respectively. In the other nest, 
intermediate goods are demanded according to fixed coefficients (Leontief). In the second nest, 
ava  is combined with the intermediate demand ( , ,i a tid ) according to a Leontief production 
function to determine the total production by activities ( ,a tactv ). Intermediate demands are 
fixed-coefficient (Leontief) multiples of total output 






(5)  𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖 = 𝜂𝜂𝑎𝑎�𝜙𝜙𝑎𝑎𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌 + (1 − 𝜙𝜙𝑎𝑎)𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌�
1
𝜌𝜌  being  𝜌𝜌 = 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎−1
𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎
    
The production by activities is disentangled into domestic ( ,i tD ) and export goods ( ,i tX ) 
according to a CES transformation (equation 6), but where the production by activities 
(𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖 ) is first aggregated by commodities according to the following equation: 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 =
∑ 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 , where 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎 represents the value share by goods and activities. iε , iδ  and T  
denote the scale parameter, the value share of domestic goods and the elasticity of 
transformation between domestic and export goods, respectively. 
(6) 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖�𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(1+𝑇𝑇) + (1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(1+𝑇𝑇)�
1
𝑇𝑇 
Armington goods ( ,i tA ) can be also demanded by the representative household ( tH ) and  the 
government ( tG ) as final goods (final consumption and investment). Both final agents take 
their optimal investment and consumption decisions while constrained by their respective 
endowments: capital ( ,H tK ), labour ( tL ), and the current account deficit ( tCC ) in the case of 
the household ( 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝐻𝐻,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿�𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆���� ) and capital and taxes in the case of the 
government (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖��� + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖). Thus, the total capital endowment is 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 = 𝐾𝐾𝐻𝐻,𝑖𝑖 + 𝐾𝐾𝐺𝐺,𝑖𝑖; and 
tw , tr and te  are the salaries, price of capital and real exchange rate, respectively. Labour and 
capital are demanded by the economic activities such that 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 and 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 which 
generate income for both agents. The sectoral demand of both factors is defined as follows: 















The demand for goods and investment of the representative household and the government 
(CES demand functions) is defined as follows: 


























i tC , ,
G
i tC , 
H
tInv  and 
G
tInv  refer to the bundle of goods and services demanded by the 
representative household, the government, and the total investment accrued by the 
representative household and the government, respectively. Each of these demands are derived 
from a maximization problem where iυ , iτ , ι  and ω  are the scale parameters;  iλ  iκ , ς  and 
ζ  denote the respective values shares; 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  and 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺,𝑖𝑖  denote the final prices of 
goods and services, the consumer price index, the price of investment and the price of 
government, repectively. hσ  and gσ refer to the elasticities of substitution for households and 
the government, respectively. Note that, in regards to the underlying utlility maximization 
processes, both the government and the representative household possess a backward-looking 
behaviour. Finally, the following identities also hold, 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 ; being 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 = ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖  
and  𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺; being 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺 = ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  such that the income balance constraints are met. 
In line with the objectives of this research, we consider two additional agents in this economy: 
general tourists and those who stay in 5-star hotels. Both demand goods and services according 
to the following CES functions: 












These functions are derived from the respective consumer utility maximization problems with 
backward-looking behaviour. The income balance constraint of both types of tourists is their 
expenditure level denoted by ttourism  and 
5*
ttourism  for the general tourists and 5-star tourists, 
respectively. 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟and  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟5∗ denote the bundle of goods and services consumed by general 
tourists and 5-star tourists, respectively. iϖ  and iπ  denote their own scale parameters; 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 and 
𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 refer to the value shares of each good, e represents the real exchange rate and touσ is the 
elasticity of substitution that is the same for both types of tourists. The information about tourist 
profiles is collected from the ISTAC. According to this source, a 5-star tourist spends in 
accommodation around 1.27 times and 1.5 times more than a 4-star and 3-star tourist, 
respectively. Overall, their average expenditure is 1.16 times above the average tourist and they 
represent around 10%-13% of total arrivals to the Canary Islands. 
In order to ensure model closure (Hosoe, Gazawa & Hashimoto, 2010), we assume that 
investment is savings-driven (i.e. saving is fixed), the government equates income with 
expenditure (i.e. zero deficit),  the world prices and foreign savings are fixed, so the exchange 
rate is flexible to clear the current account. Finally, the model also assumes the existence of 
unemployment, which is modelled according to the following condition: 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 . This 
effectively introduces a minimum wage constraint: an unemployed person is willing to work if 
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the real salary index (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖) compensates, at least, the real consumer price index (𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖), used in 
here as a proxy for the shadow price of labour. 
Finally, a dynamic model requires assumptions about the rates of economic growth ( eg ), the 
interest rate ( ir ) and the depreciation of capital (δ ) to ensure a steady state. In this sense, the 
three moratoria periods took place in different economic contexts. The first period (2003-2009) 
is characterized by steady economic growth. On the contrary, the second moratorium coincides 
with the advent of the economic crisis triggered in 2008, which led to negative growth and 
increased the unemployment rate strongly. Finally, the third moratorium took place in a more 
stable economic environment with modest positive growth, although the unemployment rate 
remained high. Thus, three dynamic CGE models with three different steady state and 
unemployment levels are generated for each of the three periods of the moratoria. The real 
economic growth observed in each of the three periods was 1,72%, -1,72% and 2.43%, 
respectively. The real interest rate was 1.4%, -0.9% and 0.3%, respectively. The depreciation 
of capital was 5% for the three periods (Escribá-Pérez, Murgui-García & Ruiz-Tamarit, 2017). 
The unemployment rate is set at 12%, 28% and 29% for the three periods, respectively 
(ISTAC). The levels of capital for the government and the household change over time 
according to the following “laws of motion”:  
(15) ,, , 1 1,(1 ) ( )H tH t H t tH tK K gos inv inv irδ δ− −= − + + +   
(16) , 0, , 1 1,(1 ) ( )G tG t G t tG tK K gos inv inv irδ δ=− −= − + + + , 
where ,H tgos and ,G tgos  denote the gross operating surpluses accrued by households and 
government, respectively. And, , 0H tinv =  and , 0G tinv = , denote the initial endowment of 
investment for households and government, respectively.   
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients of the random-effects panel-data regression. The 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects conducted prior to the 
estimation supports the use of panel data over pooled data (1123.85, p-value<0.000). 
Additionally, the White test rejects the existence of heteroskedasticty in the error term (0.22, 
p-value<0.80). To conclude, the potential endogeneity of the CPI variable was also statistically 
tested and rejected (0.218, p-value<0.64).  
The equation shows extremely high goodness-of-fit and has overall significance, as per the 
outcome of the F-test. The signs of the treatment binary variables are the expected ones in view 
of the trends shown in Figure 1. The effect of the different moratoria on the annual number of 
5-star beds in the two Canarian provinces is positive and significant in all cases, ranging 
between 34 and 124 thousand additional beds. In addition, the impact of the moratoria increases 
over time, with the current regulations leading to the highest increases in high-quality 
accommodation supply. This can be clearly linked to the successive moratoria becoming more 
relaxed in terms in terms of what types of 5-star hotels (“hotel-school”, “grand luxury” or 
“regular”) could be built. Table 3 reports the probability values of the pairwise Wald tests of 
equality of the treatment effects. The results clearly show (with 99% confidence) that the effect 
of the moratoria changed over time and was different between provinces.  
Out of the remaining coefficients, it is worth highlighting the lack of significance of the CPI 
coefficient3, as well as the positive impact of the km of coastline, which is an expected result 
                                                 
3 An alternative specification with lagged CPI did not yield a significant coefficient either. 
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given the importance of sun-and-beach tourism for Spanish regions. The year dummies 
establish the overall trend of tourism accommodation in Spain, though none of the individual 
variables is significant. Most of the province dummies are significant. Las Palmas is the 
reference category and, as expected, Santa Cruz de Tenerife is not significantly different since 
these dummies are expected to capture aspects like insularity and regional income. Without the 
impact of the moratoria, Barcelona would have been the top Spanish province for 5-star 
accommodation supply.  
The next step in the analysis is to estimate the economic impact of the rise in 5-star hotel beds 
in each period of the moratoria. To that end, three sets of annual shocks in demand have been 
calculated as follows (see table 4): the annual increase in 5-star beds fostered by the moratoria 
in each period can be obtained from the coefficients in Table 2 (adding up the coefficients of 
both provinces). These increments represent a varying percentage of the total 5-star capacity 
in the islands. Multiplying the percentage increase in 5-star capacity by the occupancy rate 
(70% according to the ISTAC) we obtain the average annual rise in tourism demand generated 
by these new beds. These are the annual shocks in demand brought to the CGE modelling.  
[Table 2] 
[Table 3] 
                                                                    [Table 4] 
Table 5 shows the results of the dynamic CGE model. The main conclusion is that the rise in 
5-star hotel beds contributes to a modestly positive economic impact in the Canary Islands 
during the three periods of the moratoria. The GDP grows annually, on average, 0.09%, 0.22% 
and 0.20% for the three periods, respectively. These changes are commensurate with the small 
share that 5-star tourists represent over the total tourism arrivals to the Islands (around 10-
13%). There is also a rise in annual household welfare (measured as Equivalent Variation - 
EV) of 0.09%, 0.25% and 0.22%, respectively. There is a decrease in total exports that can be 
explained in two ways. Firstly, the appreciation of the real exchange rate (the archipelago 
becomes relatively more expensive than the rest of the world) which erodes traditional exports. 
Secondly, the advent of 5-star tourists crowds out the other tourism segments (i.e. mass tourists) 
and their economic importance for the islands. In spite of that, the economy benefits from 
cheaper imports, which, in the case of the Canaries (where imports represent 54% of the GDP) 
means an economic relief for both firms and households. While the former see lower 
production costs, the latter also face lower inflation as shown in Table 5. The new tourist flows 
boosted by the moratoria also help to slightly reduce the high unemployment in the archipelago 
by 0.13%, 0.3%, 0.25% per year for each period, respectively. In absolute terms, there are, on 
average, around 160, 960 and 762 more annual jobs in each of the three periods, respectively.  
[Table 5] 
At the sectoral level (Table 6), all goods and services see their production increase, but, as 
expected, the tourism-based production such as “processed food, beverage and tobacco”, 
“accommodation”, “catering services”, “air transport”, “travel agencies”, “rent a car” or 
“entertainment” benefit more from the new tourist flows. These tourism-related goods/services 
show an average annual growth of 0.11%, 0.28% and 0.26% for each period, respectively. 
However, the rise in the production of non-tourism-based activities contradicts other authors’ 
findings such as Copeland (1991), Chao et al. (2006), Wattanakuljarus & Coxhead (2008), Pratt 
(2014) or Inchausti-Sintes (2015). Analysing the productive-mix of the Canary Islands, as a 
tourism-led economy, it shows a marginal weight of the industrial sector. However, and 
contrary to more diversified economies (Wattanakuljarus & Coxhead, 2008; Pratt, 2014; 
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Inchausti-Sintes 2015), it is highly oriented toward services, thus allowing for strong linkage 
effects when tourism rises.   
[Table 6] 
The same conclusion can be drawn when analysing the employment by sector (Table 7). 
Tourism-based activities again show the highest increases in employment. Comparing Tables 
6 and 7, the rise in employment is, in general, higher than the rise in production. The existence 
of unemployment pushes salaries down rising labour demand in all sectors. On the contrary, it 
generates a negative effect on the demand for capital. For instance, while the output of 
“accommodation” and “travel agencies” rises, on average, 0.05%, 0.11% and 0.11%, the 
demand for capital drops, on average, 0.06%, 0.20% and 0.13% for each period, respectively. 
Finally, we also conduct a sensitivity analysis changing key parameters of the model (-70% 
and +70% of variation) such as the Armington and 5-star tourist elasticities. The average 
differences in results are 0.001% and -0.001% for a variation of -70% and +70% in these 




The imposition of regulatory restrictions to the growth of tourism supply has been a common 
mechanism of tourism-led economies to ensure sustainable economic development, 
particularly when tourism activity has an impact on the destination’s environmental resources. 
Even though the expected economic effects of tourism moratoria have been discussed in detail 
by past authors, there is little quantitative evidence about their actual impact on the 
destinations, particularly in relation to the goal of increasing the quality of the accommodation 
supply. In order to fill this gap, this paper employs both panel-data regression and dynamic 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) methods to estimate the economic impact of the 
increased 5-star capacity acquired by the Canary Islands during the different periods of the 
successive moratoria between 2003 and 2017.  
In summary, our results show that the successive moratoria led to a significant increase in the 
5-star accommodation supply in the Canary Islands, as well as to a modestly positive economic 
impact in terms of GDP, employment and social welfare. In spite of that, it is worth 
remembering that the pursuit of higher value-added gains has to coexist with the maintenance 
and promotion of the environmental attributes, and the rational use of natural resources such 
as land and water. In addition, there are other underlying economic vulnerabilities identified, 
such as low productivity and strong dependence on the service sector triggered by tourism, 
which leave room for further public intervention to ensure a more sustainable tourism 
development. Therefore, as a body of regulation in constant evolution, future legislation should 
be adapted to address the challenge of climate change and reinforce sustainability through the 
circular economy. 
Our conclusions should be taken with caution since our approach presents a number of 
shortcomings. First, the limited time-series dimension of the dataset does not allow for a large 
number of pre-treatment observations. Second, we employ an outdated input-output table 
(2005) for the Canary Islands in the CGE model. While this is a common approach in the CGE 
literature due to data limitations, it can lead to increased quantitative prediction errors. 
However, Hosoe (2014) concludes that predictions with outdated input-output tables can still 
be qualitatively correct for decision-making purposes. Third, the availability of data at 
relatively high level of aggregation (province) does not allow us to isolate the impact of the 
moratoria for the different tourism hotspots in each island. Further research can tackle these 
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issues as new data becomes available. Finally, our calculations of economic impact do not 
consider any negative environmental externalities created by the new wave of high-end tourism 
(and the increase in demand for associated activities) that can offset the positive economic 
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